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Article (refereed) 
Absolute Other: Lacan’s ‘big Other’ as adjunct to critical 
social psychological analysis? 
 
ABSTRACT: Lacanian theory offers a series of promising 
conceptualization – amongst then the notion of the ‘big Other’ – which, 
despite their obvious analytical value, have been curiously neglected 
by critical social psychology. This paper concerns itself with an 
overview of this concept of the ‘big Other’ particularly in reference to 
how it may benefit critical social psychological analyses. The 
explanatory value of this notion is introduced via a series of Lacanian 
paradoxes (the Other as vanishing-point of inter-subjectivity that 
cannot itself be subjectivized; the Other as simultaneously “inside” and 
“outside”; the Other as both embodiment of the social substance and 
yet also the site of the unconscious). I then move on to show how this 
notion opens conceptual opportunities for social psychological 
conceptualizations of the formation of the social. I close by 
demonstrating what the ‘big Other’ offers critical social psychological 
analyses of power. 
 
Keywords: Lacan, ‘big Other’, Master-Signifier, critical psychology, identification, 
subjectivity, inter-subjectivity, power. 
 
Lacanian theory and social psychology: A non-relation?  
Speaking in 1987 on the issue of the social dimension of the psychological, 
Jacques Alain-Miller - Lacan’s heir-apparent – placed particular emphasis on the 
Freudian distinction between the ‘i’ of the ideal-ego and the ‘I’ of the ego-ideal. In 
Lacanian theory this is the differentiation between imaginary identification (‘what 
we would like to be’) and symbolic identification (identification from where we 
look at ourselves) (Žižek, 1989). On the level of the ‘I’, notes Miller  
you can without difficulties introduce the social. The I of the ideal can 
be in a superior and legitimate way constructed as a social and 
ideological function… [Lacan] did this in his Écrits: he situates a 
certain politics in the very foundations of psychology, so that the thesis 
that all psychology is social can be treated as Lacanian (p. 21, added 
emphasis). 
Miller’s comments open up a number of interesting possibilities, that concepts 
derived from Lacanian psychoanalysis may be valuable adjuncts to critical and 
social psychological analyses, firstly, and, furthermore, that Lacanian thought 
may even be enough to rejuvenate the largely defunct domain of psychoanalytic 
social psychology. Two curiosities emerge in respect of such an agenda. The first 
concerns the fact that to speak of psychoanalytic social psychology today is 
almost necessarily to speak historically. Beyond attempts to append 
psychoanalytic concepts to the frame of discursive psychology (Billig, 1997, 
1998, 1999; Gough, 2004; Parker, 1997; Riggs, 2005, Wetherell, 2003) and 
excluding for the moment efforts at linking psychoanalytic notions to types of 
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interview methodology (Frosh, Phoenix & Pattman, 2000, 2003; Hollway & 
Jefferson, 2000, 2005), there is little that one might refer to as a contemporary 
tradition of psychoanalytic social psychology, even less so one willing to keep up 
to speed with more recent innovations in psychoanalytic theory (although, 
admittedly, the contributions of Frosh (2002) and Parker (2001, 2003) make for 
something of an exception).  
The second oddity concerns the degree to which critical social psychology 
has shied away from Lacanian theory in particular (again there are exceptions, 
see Frosh & Baraitser, 2003; Parker, 2005; Georgaca, 2005) – the body of 
thought which represents perhaps the most vital re-invigorating current within 
psychoanalysis today. One is even tempted in this respect to view Billig’s (2006) 
angry rejection of Lacan’s “misuse of psychology” as symptomatic of Social 
Psychology’s general response to Lacanian theory. This lack of engagement is 
striking inasmuch as Lacanian theory offers important insights into many of what 
we might consider the constituting problematics of social psychology, whether we 
have in mind the dilemmas of racism (Fanon, 1952; Seshadri-Crooks, 2000; 
Žižek, 1994b, 1997) and ideology (Glynos, 2001; Laclau, 1996; Stavrakakis, 
1997, 1999, 2007; Žižek, 1989, 1994a), the quandaries of “gendered” subjectivity 
(Frosh, 2002; Mitchell & Rose, 1982; Salecl, 2000; Verhaeghe, 2001, 2002; 
Wright, 2000), the broader issues of social identification and the relation to a 
“generalized Other” (Fink, 1995, 1997; Salecl, 1994a, 2004; Žižek, 1992a, 1992b, 
2001) or the nature and functioning of discourse (Bracher et al., 1994).  
Without launching into a lengthy digression on the above themes and their 
corresponding Lacanian insights, it might suffice to provide just two exemplars of 
the usefulness of key Lacanian motifs in social psychological analysis. The 
notion of jouissance (excessive libidinal enjoyment) has provided an enabling 
perspective on the libidinal economy of racism, and indeed, on the issue – often 
avoided by discursive accounts – of the responsibility for the ‘enjoyment’ of racist 
utterances (Salecl, 1998; Žižek, 1994, 2005). Likewise, the fact of the 
paradoxical and often ‘external’ character of belief as articulated by Lacan 
(1992), usefully extended by Žižek’s (1989, 2006) notion of inter-passivity - I 
myself need not believe for there to be a believing of which I am part – extends 
our grasp on the prevalence and power of ideology in ostensibly non-ideological 
times (Pfaller, 2005; Porter, 2006; Sharpe, 2004). 
Social Psychology’s avoidance of these and other related concepts is 
notable given that many Lacanian notions - jouissance, the triad of the 
imaginary/symbolic/real, objet petit a, the big Other, etc. – have by now assumed 
a certain currency with the broader field of social and political theory (Badiou, 
2001, 2005; Butler, 1993, 1997; Butler, Laclau & Žižek, 2000; Critchley, 2007; 
Laclau, 1996; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). This lack of recourse is more conspicuous 
yet in view of the newly emerging body of literature at the interface of popular 
culture and Lacanian psychoanalysis (Dolar, 1999, 2006; Leader, 1996, 2002; 
Salecl 1994a, 2004; Slavoj Žižek, 1992a, 1992b; to name just a few) which has 
done much to establish a middle-ground between Lacanian theory as abstruse 
apparatus of clinical and philosophical reflection and a more accessible social 
and cultural grounds of application. My aim here is not to address this lack of 
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engagement in any further detail; my intention is rather to flag up this issue, to 
leave it as hanging question, deserving future attention. I prefer here to adopt a 
more constructive tack, to look outside of critical social psychology to promising 
developments outside of the field (i.e. within Lacanian theory), concerning myself 
thus with the demonstrative exercise of showing the usefulness of one particular 
Lacanian concept to critical social psychology, namely that of the ‘big Other’.  
Although or engagement with the notion of the big Other will necessarily 
be incomplete – Evans (1996) speaks of the ‘other’ as “perhaps the most 
complex term in Lacan’s work” (p. 132) – I will nevertheless aim to demonstrate 
something of the term’s explanatory and analytical efficacy. Not only is this a 
concept that sheds light on the ever-vexing question of the subject-to-society 
relation, it is also one that brings with it a series of lessons about the 
spontaneous emergence of certain forms of power and social identification. A 
series of interlinked questions will thus be important in what follows, the first of 
which opens conceptual opportunities for social psychological understandings of 
the formation of the social, the second of which concerns more directly critical 
social psychological understandings of the mechanisms of power, authority and 
role-induction. Firstly then: how are we as individual subjects linked into the 
social? How is such an operation managed, moreover, in such a way that 
consolidates a disparate field of individuals into a coherent society and that thus 
attains the social objectivity of “the way things are done” in a given culture or 
community? Secondly, how do the relations thus established give rise to 
apparently inevitable effects of power and truth; how is it that such relations 
necessarily instantiate a locus of authority and knowledge?  
One last remark is necessary before we turn to addressing these 
questions. Clearly my attempt here - along with the broader tentative project of a 
‘Lacanian psychoanalytic social psychology’ - requires the mediation of a series 
of reasons why Lacanian psychoanalysis is not simply a mode of psychology. 
Certain such points of incompatibility will in fact become apparent as we 
continue; to stress the obvious: these are differences that should not be under-
estimated. All I wish to note here is that such a task of qualification need not 
imperil the project of outlining a Lacanian social psychology provided that in 
doing so we are prepared to radically reconsider the parameters of the ‘social 
psychological’. 
 
Paradoxes of the Other 
 
The vanishing point of inter-subjectivity 
 
There are a series of paradoxes underlining the notion of the big Other that need 
be attended to if we are to introduce the concept in a way from which social 
psychology might benefit. The first of these concerns the fact that the big Other 
exists at a step removed from the dialectics of inter-subjectivity despite that it 
grounds the coherence of any such interchange. One might accentuate this 
apparent paradox by insisting on two important facets of the Lacanian notion: the 
Other is always somehow enigmatic, it escapes encapsulation, it is always an 
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absolute Other, conditioned by a fundamental alterity, despite that it remains the 
very stuff - the social substance – of my attempts at comprehension. 
In accounting for this paradox we need refer to an elementary distinction, 
first voiced by Lacan in his Seminar II between the Other and others. In respect 
of the latter, one refers to other subjects, people with whom I might identify with, 
or enter into aggressive rivalries and conflicts with; these are ‘little’ others with 
whom inter-subjective relations are possible. The Other, by contrast, stands 
beyond the realm of imaginary identifications; it exists outside of the frame of 
such games of mirrored wholeness and antagonism. I do not, indeed mistake 
‘Other for I’ and ‘I for Other’. Freud (1921) provides a nice example of this in 
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego: when a solider adopts habits of 
his peers this makes him one of the group; if on the other hand he attempts to 
adopt the mannerisms of his General, he becomes ridiculous. Incidentally, this 
example nicely replicates the distinction introduced at the very beginning of the 
paper, between the ‘i’ of the ideal-ego (imaginary identifications with like others – 
i.e. fellow soldiers) and the ‘I’ of the ego-ideal (symbolic identifications that gain 
their orientation from the place from which we look at ourselves). 
Put bluntly then, there is no psychological domestication of the Other, it 
remains always radically exterior, beyond the horizon of any conceivable inter-
subjectivity. It cannot, in and of itself, be subjectivized, given a localized 
psychology. Importantly however, as Lacan points out in Seminar VIII, another 
subject may occupy this position, and may thus ‘embody’ the Other – albeit in an 
impermanent or contingent manner - for another subject (as is the case of the 
General in the Freud example). We might say then that the Other is the 
vanishing-point which provides the co-ordinates for inter-subjectivity despite that 
it itself cannot be ‘subjectivized’. 
 
The ‘rules of the game’ 
 
The ‘beyondness’ of the Other is best grasped in connection with a second 
crucial component of the concept, the notion of the Other as the entirety of the 
symbolic domain, that is, as not only the rituals and institutions around which our 
society is organized, “but the very language which marks the subject as a 
speaking being” (Salecl, 1998, p. 21). This is the Other both as “the collection of 
all the words and expressions in a language” (Fink, 1995, p. 5), and the Other as 
social substance, as the amassed roles, traditions, understandings and unwritten 
obligations that define a given societal situation, the Other, in other words, as the 
‘rules that govern the game’. The Other here is an alienating system, an always 
already existing totality to which the subject needs accommodate themselves; it 
is the “treasury of signifiers” with which there can be no automatic or harmonious 
fit. As is by no doubt apparent, our distance from everyday conceptions of 
psychological subjectivity is here pronounced. We have been confronted with a 
kind of supra-agency – be it that of language, the entire accumulated mass of 
‘the social’ – which speaks through, or over, which appears to determine the 
subject. In the tussle between psychological subjectivity and the role of 
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determining structure, the Lacanian notion of the Other, so it would seem, is on 
the side of structure.  
A daunting question arises at this point – a second paradox – namely that 
of how the Other emerges. We confront here, as Žižek (1996) stresses, the 
apparent deadlock between methodological individualism (the explanatory 
primacy of individuals and their interactions) and the Durkheimian notion of 
Society as ‘always already there’, the notion of society as the substantial order 
that serves as the spiritual foundation of individual being. Or, framed slightly 
differently, if it is the case, as Evans (1996) asserts, that “the Other is the 
symbolic insofar as it is particularized for each subject” (p. 133), then how is the 
Other is also the embodiment of social substance, that which amounts to more 
than the sum total of a society’s individuals? Or, to echo one of our opening 
questions: how is it then that ‘the social’ comes to constitute a type of objectivity 
(of accepted background norms, mores and values, a ‘rules of the game’) that 
exceeds a mere aggregation of individuals?  
 
I don’t know what I am going to say 
 
“The ‘big Other’” says Žižek, is the name for social substance, it is that on 
account of which the subject never fully dominates the effects  of their acts, “on 
account of which the final outcome of his or her activity is always something 
other than what was intended or anticipated” (2005, p. 332). Given this reference 
to extra-intentional acts and effects, along with the above reference to the supra-
agency of the Other, it is not hard to anticipate the more overtly psychoanalytic – 
and clinical – application of this idea of the Other as the treasury of signifiers. 
Indeed, the Structuralist echoes of the above quote need be taken in conjunction 
with the associated notion that the unconscious can be regarded – as in Lacan’s 
famous assertion – as “the discourse of the Other” (Lacan, 1977). The Other 
here is tantamount to another locality, an ‘other place’, a term in which Freud’s 
description of the ‘other scene’ of dreams shines through.  
Lacan’s assertion in Écrits is that the origin of speech cannot be fixed in 
the subject – for the effects of subject are taken always to exceed the controls of 
the ego – and should instead be located in the Other (1977, p. 16). Lacan’s claim 
implies the importance of a focus on the dimension of speech itself, and draws 
attention to the role of the Other as a kind of ‘hovering interlocutor’ that 
accompanies each instance of speaking. Here then a third paradox: how is the 
Other both “the discourse of the unconscious” and the ‘rules of the game’, the 
‘treasury of signifiers’ of the entire symbolic order?  
It is useful in this respect to revisit a rudimentary psychoanalytic postulate 
concerning the truthfulness of bungled speech. The uncertainty, the unreliability 
of the spoken word, nicely emphasized in Verhaeghe’s (2001) reminder “when I 
speak, I do not know what I am going to say” (p. 22), is here of crucial 
importance. What comes with the use of language, the cost, as it were, of 
attempts at expression within this foreign system, is that more than one line of 
meaning can be traced through what I have just said. The speech we produce is 
always thus shadowed by an Other sensibility. In other words, speaking is never 
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merely a function of ego discourse; it remains always the enunciative possibility 
for an Other tongue, for the Lacanian unconscious which precisely is the 
processes of signification beyond the control of the speaking subject. With these 
points of concern – the extra-intentional, the unconscious, the seemingly external 
locus of speech – we can once again mark our distance from the mainstream of 
social psychological analysis. 
 
From where I am heard 
 
The Other, notes Leader (2000), is not only the set of elements that make up the 
symbolic world the subject is born into, it also the symbolic place which is present 
each time that someone speaks. The puzzle that emerges here – to reiterate the 
paradox just offered - is that we have two apparent directions or locations. We 
have the Other apparently “inside” us, as the foreign language – or “mOther 
tongue” to use Fink’s (1995) helpful phrase – that we rely upon in our attempts at 
expression. Then there is the “outside” Other, the Other as the set of 
communicative rules and symbolic codes which forms the grounds and basis of 
all attempts at meaning-making. This, we might say, is the Other as a locus of 
listening: 
The Other is a place from which you are heard, from which you are 
recognized. The Other is thus the place of language, external to the 
speaker, and yet, since he or she is a speaker, internal at the same 
time (Leader, 1995, p. 60).  
It is perhaps easier to grasp this apparent double-nature of the Other (the Other 
as both “inside” and “outside”; as both ‘discourse of the unconscious’ and the 
social substance) by drawing attention to how each act of speaking presupposes 
a point of reception, a place of intelligibility from which one might be understood. 
This is one of the points Lacan (1977) makes about the functioning of speech in 
Écrits: each instance of speech implies an interlocutor, even (we might add) if 
this interlocutor is little more than a hypothetical postulate.  
Why is it, we might ask, that we use socially-intelligible terms to express 
ourselves – when I swear to express frustration, say – even when we are totally 
alone? The Lacanian answer: as speaking subjects we never step outside of the 
social field. Every time we are involved in the making of meaning – even if only to 
ourselves – we do so in view of a context of potential recognition (i.e. of ‘how one 
is heard’). Such a place of recognition – never within the confines of our control – 
necessarily plays a crucial role in determining the meaning of our utterances, in 
how they are taken up, how they resonate.  
 
The frame of social intelligibility 
 
What is being insisted upon here - again a seemingly “extra-psychological” 
perspective – is the radical contingency, the externality of even our most private 
expressions. We have a sense thus of how meaning might be said to come from 
the Other, and an awareness also of how the apparent “inside”/”outside” 
distinction posed above collapses. Any act of signification is only intelligible, only 
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indeed possible against a background framework of rules and presuppositions 
that, as it were, co-determines my meaning. This is also how to understand the 
overlap of the Other as symbolic order and the unconscious as “discourse of the 
Other”. We are concerned once again with the impossibility of ever fully 
controlling the implications of one’s speech within the social field: this 
impossibility – in contrast to the presumptions of a depth psychology - is the 
precondition for effects of the unconscious. To be doubly sure: the eternal 
disparity between what speakers intend to say and the enunciative dimension of 
how this is actually performed and/or heard against the backdrop of the ‘treasury 
of signifiers’ is an absolute condition of possibility for the emergence of the 
Lacanian unconscious. The Other as language, as frame of social and 
communicative intelligibility is thus coterminous with the eruption within everyday 
speech of unconscious discourse. 
Salecl adds a useful gloss to these issues which works to summarize much 
of the foregoing discussion. The Other, she says, is the symbolic structure in 
which the subject has always been embedded. It is not a positive social fact: 
it is quasi-transcendental, and forms the frame structuring our 
perception of reality; its status is normative, it is a world of symbolic 
rules and codes. As such, it also does not belong to the psychic level: 
it is a radically external, non-psychological universe of symbolic codes 
regulating our psychic self-experience. It is a mistake either to 
internalize the big Other and reduce it to a psychological fact, or to 
externalize the big Other and reduce it to institutions in social reality 
(Salecl, 1998, p. 17). 
Elsewhere she (1994b) applies the notion of the Other to account for the 
ideological force of education, an ideological force, she convincingly argues, that 
cannot be reduced either to the result of institutional structure (as in Marxist 
accounts), nor simply to the psychological pragmatics of inter-subjective speech 
(as in speech-act theory). Perhaps one of the most crucial facets of this notion – 
vital to grasp if we are to profit from its analytical value – is that the Other, the 
‘third in any dialogue’, is explained neither by sole reference to structure nor by 
exclusive explanations of psychological subjectivity. It arises indivisibly between 
structure and psyche, as the mediator between the societal and the individual 
which inevitably conditions each such interchange without becoming a sub-
category of either side. 
In this introductory section I have obviously not been able to address all 
the issues arising from the paradoxes highlighted above. Then again, variants on 
these themes - particularly the deadlock of methodological individualism versus 
social primacy, the facet of the Other as indivisible mediator – will feature in what 
we now wish to discuss, namely the subject of the Other as it features in the 
realization of power. 
 
Appealing to the symbolic 
 
In two of Freud’s most famous cases he is confronted with a similar 
epistemological quandary, that in which the predominance of a certain schema - 
 7
the fear of a castrating father for the Wolf Man, the emergence of the Oedipus 
complex for Little Hans – seems completely disproportionate to the empirical 
details of the case. In neither case do the ‘actual facts’ - the nanny’s castration 
threat to the Wolf Man, or the pathetic, subservient father of little Hans - seem up 
to the task of generating the formidable complexes that do eventually emerge. 
We have thus a disconcerting mismatch between empirical phenomena and 
structure. In Freud’s terms: “We are often able to see the schema triumphing 
over the experience of the individual”, as in the Wolf Man case where “the boy’s 
father became the castrator and menace of his infantile sexuality in spite of what 
was…an inverted Oedipus complex” (1918, p. 119). 
This is not simply, as some might have it, a case of Freud’s insistence on 
the ascendance of his own theoretical model over and above the empirical 
details of the case. A more important point is being made about the spontaneous 
emergence of certain regular schemata, certain structures of response which far 
exceed their apparent factual grounds of possibility. Freud’s response to this 
dilemma - one that no doubt strikes us today as inadequate - is via recourse 
“phylogenetically inherited schemata” which he says, “like the categories of 
philosophy, are concerned with the business of ‘placing’ the impressions derived 
from actual experience” (p. 119).  As Leader (2003, 2007) has pointed out, a 
structural, indeed, Lacanian re-reading of this paragraph would draw attention to 
the change of registers implied by the recourse to phylogenetic history. There is 
thus something enabling in the Freudian idea that when the child confronts a 
certain deadlock - a ‘real’ experience that is impossible for them to make sense 
of - they make an appeal to symbolic prehistory (Leader, 2007). The importance 
of such an appeal to the Symbolic in the face of deadlocks of experience is that it 
goes some way to explaining how subjects are able to manifest perfectly 
workable (Oedipal, castration) complexes – “inherited schemata” – even in the 
absence of obviously supporting empirical circumstances. This, the fact of the 
apparently spontaneous emergence of certain structures of power – that is, the 
abrupt manifestation of certain Others of authority and the assumption of 
particular roles of subservience relative to such Others – will prove crucial in 
what follows. 
 
What is the source of power? 
 
In an important paper ‘Where does power come from?’ Mladen Dolar (1999) 
traces a series of parallels and disparities between Lacanian and Foucauldian 
conceptions of power. He begins by isolating the similarity between two signature 
slogans: Foucault’s ‘Power doesn’t exist’ (in any substantive or structural manner 
that is) and Lacan’s ‘The Other lacks’ (Dolar, p. 79). What then is the crucial 
difference between these two approaches? 
For psychoanalysis – despite the later Lacan’s insistence on the fictional 
status of the symbolic (the notion that ‘the big Other doesn’t exist’) – the Other is 
always already there. It is an automatic point of appeal; it emerges by virtue of 
the subject’s negotiation with structure, as an effect of their involvement in 
language. This hypothetical “figure supposed to know” functions as the 
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embodiment of authority and knowledge - it is, as Stavrakakis (1999) nicely puts 
it, the order of a Master and guarantor – and it emerges even in the absence of 
overt asymmetries of power. For psychoanalysis, claims Dolar, it is this Other 
than can account for the mechanisms of power. For Foucault, by contrast, we 
cannot assume any such Other as a starting point for analysis, or as an 
explanatory device; any such effects of the Other must themselves be explained, 
linked into a genealogical trajectory of forces and events. This may give us 
reason to pause: surely, we might ask, Foucault here is right; we must be able to 
account for the Other in the terms of a series of interlinked effects and 
strategies? It cannot, after all, be seen as a transcendental factor, as an 
automatic dimension of human existence?  
Turning for the moment back to psychoanalysis, we might ask: when does 
the Other arise for the subject? What are the minimal conditions of emergence 
for that which is said to ‘always already’ exist? Dolar’s response is 
straightforward: the Other arises the moment the subject is confronted with the 
symbolic structure. This is what Lacanian theory directs us to, an appreciation 
that any symbolic structure or social milieu has the effect - at least if we are to 
successfully participate, communicate within its means - of installing such a point 
of authority and appeal. As in the Wolf Man and Little Hans cases, such an 
appeal is often driven by the imperative of needing to place or make symbolic 
sense of ‘real’ experiences that cannot otherwise be comprehended (Leader, 
2007). The supposition of such a locus of authority and knowledge provides a 
crucial means of grasping how we are linked into the symbolic realm, perhaps 
precisely so at those points when it seems compromised, threatened with 
collapse. It is vital in this respect to emphasize the unavoidability of the Other, its 
structural inescapability.  
The Other, to reiterate, is necessarily posited by each instance of social 
interaction; it is the point of intelligibility which makes the system of inter-
subjectivity work. The big Other, as Dolar (1999) notes, is 
the hypothetical authority that upholds the structure and the supposed 
address of any act of speech, beyond interlocution or intersubjectivity, 
the third in any dialogue (p. 87). 
One of the prospective benefits of such an approach is that it understands the 
seemingly spontaneous emergence of such effects of structure on subjectivity. 
Foucault’s error then, we might conclude, is to make what appears an intuitive 
demand: asking after the preconditions, the chain of material causes and 
situational variables behind any ‘Other-effects’. In so doing, he misses something 
of the Other as an immediate eventuality of the subject’s engagement with 
structure. That is, he fails to grasp the Other as an always already present 
principle of authority, and thus misses something crucial about the automatic 
instantiation of power. 
 
l’ Autre n’existe pas 
 
There is a crucial paradox to be added to those discussed above: despite that it 
functions as a crucial anchoring-point, a locus of authority and knowledge, 
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despite its very inevitability, the Other is lacking, not whole. This is something 
that is easy to overlook once we have grasped the importance of the Other as 
‘the third in every dialogue’, as the background, the ‘objective spirit’ to use 
Hegel’s term dictating ‘the way things are done’, the implicit already accepted 
standards of value and belief within a given society. We must though remain 
attentive to the frequent qualifications in Lacanian theory: the Other – along with 
all the knowledge and/or authority it is supposed to embody – never moves 
beyond the status of presupposition, hypothesis. It is never fully confirmed, 
definitely established - except in fantasy-formations, such as that of the ideal, 
harmonious society, the soul-mate partner that fully completes me – but always 
retains doubt, indefiniteness, virtuality as defining features. One can never be 
absolutely sure about the Other. It is always, in part, a transferential relation. 
This lack, or indeed, non-existence of the Other (as in Lacan’s l’ Autre 
n’existe pas) – something that every successful analysis is said to reveal - does 
not mean that Other ceases to function as an operative principle of social and 
communicative coherence. This is precisely the paradox: the Other is at the 
same time lacking, a domain of presumption and fiction, and yet it nonetheless 
remains the anchoring-point that a given society relies upon to maintain its 
coherence. There is no necessary contradiction here: it is quite possible that we 
continue to act as if the Other exists, even if in a rational or cynical frame of mind 
we claim not to believe in any such over-riding principle of authority. This, 
incidentally, is why the intellectual insight of the Other’s insubstantiality – that 
there is ultimately no final, absolute truth, no single authority of being – remains 
an inadequate level of realization for psychoanalysis. 
Žižek (1989, 2001) is in his element when discussing such vicissitudes of 
belief. It is enough, he notes, that we think others believe (or that they did once 
believe) to instantiate an Other; we need not consciously subscribe to a particular 
version of the Other (God, Nation, the Cause, Justice, etc.) for our activities to 
adhere to, and indeed, confirm such a locus of authority and truth. A Lacanian, 
he says, does not simply dismiss the Other; “he counts on the efficiency of the 
big Other, yet he does not trust it, since he knows he is dealing with an order of 
semblance” (1994b, p. 209). It is worth pausing to note here that all the examples 
provided above (God, Nation, the ideological Cause, Justice) are potent signifiers 
– they represent ideals that many are willing to live and die for – that as such 
bear the weight of considerable investment and fervour. How then do we account 
for this overlap of emptiness and undecidability with the operation of a primary 
signifier, this extraordinary co-incidence of that which is hypothetical, even 
fictional, with that which, potentially, means everything? 
 
Imbalance in the system 
 
In a critique of Derrida, Žižek (1994b) warns that one cannot reduce the Lacanian 
symbolic “to the balanced economy of exchange” (p. 195). The reason for this is 
that such a system inevitably yields one or more privileged signifiers; not all 
signifiers, we might say, are equal in such an economy. Linking this to our 
immediate concerns: Lacan’s concept of the Other moves beyond the classic 
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Structuralist conception of a differential system of components, to an 
appreciation of the fact that certain key ideas – the motifs of a given ideology, for 
instance - attain a disproportionate hold upon us. Returning to Dolar (1999): 
Any notion of structure, far from being simply differential, a balanced 
matrix of permutations, necessarily gives rise to a ‘Master Signifier’, a 
structural function that power gets hold of, but which is in itself empty, 
devoid of meaning, a pure positivization of a void (p. 87). 
To put this in more straightforward terms: any symbolic or social system will yield 
certain prioritized values and notions. These are the anchoring-points, the 
apparent fixities – the exceptional signifiers - around which a great many other 
signifiers coalesce and come to gain meaning, a semblance of fixity. Ultimately 
there is no natural primacy to these markers – they remain forever hollow, 
insubstantial, empty. That however is less important than the fact that the social 
or symbolic system in question needs an unquestioned assumption as a centring 
point, their navigational principle - their ‘magnetic north’- in terms of which all 
surrounding signifiers gain a sense, a location, an identity. 
Such Master Signifiers are not easily contested, refuted, or denied – 
hence the idea that not all signifiers in a given field are equal - because they play 
such an important role in fixing meanings, in providing co-ordinates for 
surrounding signifiers. What is of utmost importance in this respect is that these 
Master Signifiers emerge precisely at those points where meaning can never be 
fully determined. It is not then simply a coincidence that undecidability and 
primary signification occur at one and the same place; what we are dealing with 
here is precisely ‘the positivization of a void’ in Dolar’s phrase. 
Glynos (2001), in a summary of the Lacanian position, makes essentially 
the same point.. Society, he says, lacks an ultimate signifier with which to make it 
complete: 
[N]othing positive can be said about the ‘truth’ of society except that it 
is incomplete – in Lacanian terms, that there is a ‘lack in the symbolic 
Other’. Thus, society exists as a totality only insofar as the social 
subject posits its existence as such through the mediation of empty 
signifiers (2001, p. 197). 
 
From lack to that which means everything 
 
Let us take an everyday example: if one is to interrogate one’s own deepest 
values, and to press on with question after question as to ‘why?’, as to what lies 
behind, what justifies the single most important belief we claim to have – whether 
it is a spiritual, an emotional, a political commitment – this chain of values will 
ultimately lead to an empty ‘because I do’, ‘because it is’. Being in love provides 
another example; the reason why I love this person is never fully rationalized by 
the string of signifiers which follow on from this fact; being in love is itself a self-
justifying fact which always exceeds the ‘reasons why I love them’. 
What Lacanian theory is attentive to is the moment in which such a lack - 
the inability to articulate a final justification, a definitive substance - switches over 
into something quite different, into that which (potentially) lies behind the 
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meaning of everything, that which grounds me, providing a coherent social role 
and significance for my existence. A failure, in short – an inability to explain – is 
thus translated into the positive condition of our existence as types of meaningful 
social subjects. As Glynos (2001) puts it: epistemological incapacity is hence 
transformed into the positive ontological condition of society and of our social 
subjectivity. It is this that the Other is a beneficiary of: the conversion, as Žižek 
puts it, of undecidability with regard to its forever unsure signified into an 
exceptional signifier, the empty Master Signifier: 
‘Nation’, ‘Democracy’, ‘Socialism’ and other causes stand for 
‘something’ about which we are never sure what exactly, it is – the 
point is, rather, that by identifying with Nation we signal our 
acceptance of what others accept, with a Master signifier which serves 
as the rallying point for all the others (Žižek, 1996, p. 142). 
 
Meaning-to-come 
 
We appreciate something then about the virtuality of the Other – the Other as 
hypothesis, as “the subject supposed to know” – whom, like the analyst, remains 
always in part the result of a transferential relation (i.e. what we presume of 
them). More than this, we understand how this virtuality of the Other enables it to 
act as a Master Signifier which is thus able – because of, not in spite of its 
indefiniteness – to consolidate the social field. The factor of positing, of 
presumption, indeed, the operation of a type of transference, is thus absolutely 
crucial: the emptiness of the Other, its non-existence as any definitive entity or 
substance, is a precondition of its persistence of its powers of social 
consolidation. 
As Žižek (1996) explains, we are hence dealing with a “meaning to come” 
which although it is never fully actualized, functions as if it is already effective. 
So, by the time ‘God’ or ‘Nation’ works as a rallying-point for a group, it already 
effectively co-ordinates their activity, consolidates them as a society even though 
each of them might indeed have differing notions as to what ‘God’ or ‘Nation’ 
might in fact be. In short, and here it is worth quoting Žižek at length: 
‘Transference’ designates the subject’s trust in meaning-to-come… 
Consequently, in so far as the big Other functions as the guarantee of 
the meaning-to-come, the very fact of the big Other involves the 
subjective gesture of precipitation. In other words: how do we pass 
from the…dispersed, inconsistent collection of signifiers to the big 
Other qua qua consistent order? By supplementing the inconsistent 
series of signifiers with a Master-Signifier, S1, a signifier of pure 
potentiality of meaning-to-come; by this precipitation (the intervention 
of an ‘empty’ signifier which stands for meaning-to-come) the symbolic 
field is completed, changed into a closed order (1996, pp. 144). 
The same type of operation is found in how the Other functions as ‘the third in 
every dialogue’, that is, as a principle of communicative intelligibility. As in 
attempts to fathom the Other, to grasp the key to social meaning, the subject also 
confronts a type of unknowability in their communicative counterparts. Again, 
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what is staged is a confrontation with a constitutive impossibility. Whether we are 
dealing with the primordial opacity of other subjects, or with the inability of 
subjects to perfectly co-ordinate their communicative intentions, to become 
transparent to one another, in either case we arrive at the very impossibility 
which links the subject to the social substance. This, Žižek advances, is Lacan’s 
answer to the dilemma of how we move from the mere collection of others to the 
collectivity, from the mutual reflection of other individuals to an impersonal reified 
Order of social substance.  
The very impossibility of such a knowing of others, of such a perfected 
communicative interchange, of the social mass being jointly co-ordinated, gives 
rise to a virtual supplement – a kind of spiritual substance – which goes some 
way to helping us negotiate this impossibility. As Žižek bluntly puts it, “if 
individuals were able to co-ordinate their intentions via shared knowledge, there 
would be no need for the big Other” (1996, p. 138). 
The undecidability, the radical uncertainty in question, the lack of guarantee 
about what my place is, or concerning what my partner’s words, acts and 
customs mean, my attempts to determine the regulating ‘rules of the game’, 
these problems, to reiterate, do not point to a deficiency, but rather to a positive 
ontological feature of my social existence: 
the ultimate proof of my inclusion in the big Other: the big Other 
‘functions’ as the substance of our being, we are ‘within’ effectively 
embedded in it, precisely and only in so far as its status is irreducibly 
undecidable” (Žižek, 1996, pp. 136-137).  
 
Precipitate identification 
 
What should not be lost on us here is how we have returned to the concerns that 
opened this paper, that is, to the distinction between imaginary and symbolic 
identification and, more directly, to the assertion that critical and social 
psychological analyses should focus particularly on the vicissitudes of symbolic 
modes of identification. What is the link here between symbolic identification and 
the function of the Other as Master Signifer? 
I emphasized above what it was that enabled the Other – the indivisible 
mediator between societal and subjective that precisely co-ordinates our 
communicative attempts – to operate as a Master Signifier. To reiterate: this co-
ordination, always more presupposed, transferential than real, is enabled not at 
the level of the signified, not via some definitive shared content, but precisely at 
the more open-ended level of the signifier. The factor of undecidablility is again 
here key: what is being identified with is not some concrete image, some 
delimited object of knowledge, but – indeed, a meaning-to-come - that which 
others accept and identify with. Identification with a Master Signifier – something 
we as socialized human subjects can barely avoid – is an odd sort of 
identification, it is neither direct nor with anything substantial. It is not an 
identification with any concrete thing; it is rather identification with the very 
gesture of identification, as Žižek (1996) insists.  
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To be sure: we are plugged into a similar social network by virtue of the 
fact of identifications with the indefinite, always open Master Signifier that others 
are also identified with. Hence the notion of a precipitate identification – no less 
powerful for such a status – that involves not a direct relation with an object, but 
a relation with an inconclusive (Master) signifier that others have also taken on – 
again a sense of the acceptance of what others accept – and have done so as a 
means of avoiding the uncertainty of their (our) social being. 
 
Foucault’s Other 
 
In what has gone above I have emphasized the spontaneity of the emergence of 
the Other as the inevitable effect of the subject’s engagement with symbolic 
structure. I have suggested both that the appeal to the symbolic (to the Other) 
may be driven by deadlocks of experience, and that the power-effects of 
knowledge and authority with which the Other is associated often far outstrip the 
apparent material or empirical conditions of emergence. I have stressed also the 
hypothetical status of the Other, the factor of its virtuality, its transferential quality 
as locus of authority and truth. These are all valuable considerations in 
questioning the functioning of social and psychological power.  
Back then to Dolar’s critique of Foucault: does Foucault not at times 
effectively rely, if not somewhat covertly, on something akin to the notion of the 
Other in his account of disciplinary mechanisms? This is precisely Dolar’s (1999) 
argument. Foucault, he claims, is compelled to covertly introduce the Other, “not 
just as an effect produced by mechanisms, but as something that itself produces 
effects” (p. 87). Moreover, it seems that Foucault makes assumptions about the 
structure of subjectivity at work within disciplinary power which run counter to the 
notion of the subject as merely the outcome of power.  
Dolar points particularly to the discrepancy in Discipline & Punish between 
Foucault’s methodological proclamations (regards the specificity of instruments 
and locations of power) and the generalizability of the results of his analysis of 
disciplinary power. Despite the diversity of procedures and tactics in the 
disciplinary domain, the diagram of the Panopticon – which Foucault often treats 
as paradigmatic of modern power – easily unites these facets into a common 
pattern. It is astonishing, ventures Dolar (1999), 
that the multiplicity of dispersed and heterogenous micro-relations 
converges into one single image of power which is entirely imbued 
with the figure of the Other… Foucault’s strategy of dispersed micro-
relations eventually converge in a…massive presence of the Other (p. 
88). 
Dolar recognizes that Foucault’s account of disciplinarity dissolves the standard 
figure-heads of power (the King, the Father, the Master, etc.). He appreciates 
also Foucault’s focus on the broader array of instruments and material 
arrangements that would appear to supersede such singular authorities (the 
architecture of the prison for example, its various systems of surveillance). The 
irony that remains however is that in the very gesture of removing the King, of 
vacating his place of power, one leaves an empty space that “makes his 
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presence all the more pervasive and intractable” (Dolar, p. 88). What is the 
element of continuity – despite Foucault’s protestations - that we may detect 
here? Is there not a similar pattern of influence on display: the awareness of an 
Other that sees and knows, the presence of a presumed Other of authority that 
remains even if now this Other is present in the geometry of the prison or the 
architecture of the school rather than in the embodied form of a sovereign figure?  
Emptying out the contents of the Other, sheering it of its actual empirical 
detail, its definitive object-status – as we have learned in reference to the Master 
Signifier – by no means destroys the power of its hold upon us - quite the 
contrary. Similarly, as we know from Little Hans, the fact that there is no overt 
empirical Other, no intimidating father or conventional agent of power, poses no 
necessary problem in generating effects of power (of an Other);  again, the 
contrary seems the case. Doing away with the sovereign configuration of power 
by no means dissipates the Other, if anything – this is Dolar’s argument – the 
different measures of disciplinarity incur the Other ever more forcefully. Emptying 
the place of power, notes Dolar, makes contingent events appear to be all the 
more ruled by the invisible hand of the Other. So even though the Other is 
discarded by Foucault at the outset of his analysis of modern power, it 
nevertheless returns surreptitiously in the end, perhaps all the more haunting, all 
the more powerful precisely because it has been elided. For Dolar then we 
seriously undercut the efficacy of our analyses of power, sociality or of 
subjectivity if we do not take seriously the possibility of the Other, that is, of a 
point of appeal and authority able to anchor subjects in the social-symbolic matrix 
of relations without itself being reduced to a secondary effect. “[T]hat the Other 
emerges at all” he says, “the supposition that…there is a sense to be made, that 
there is a knowledge... this is the kernel of both power and knowledge” (p. 90). 
“Without the Other” he concludes, “there is no ‘effect’ of power nor the ‘psychic 
economy’ that makes it possible… Power works only if and as long as we 
assume the Other” (1999, p. 92). 
 
Conclusion: Retreiving the unconscious 
 
Within this paper I have pointed in the direction of a prospective conceptual ally 
for social psychological analyses. More specifically, I have suggested that 
Lacan’s notion of the big Other has much to offer both to social psychological 
conceptualizations of the subject-to-society relation and to critical psychological 
attempts to grasp how effects of authority, power and subservience are 
generated. Given the complex and often paradoxical nature of Lacan’s concept 
of the Other I have opted for a descriptive rather than comparative analysis, 
preferring rather to demonstrate the explanatory usefulness of the term over a 
hasty attempt to liken it so a variety of existing psychological concepts. The latter 
option would no doubt detract from my attempt to foreground what is most 
distinctive in this Lacanian notion.  
This is not to suggest that a subsequent discussion might not take up this 
objective: linking the ‘big Other’ to a series of social psychological ideas which 
bear a certain resemblance to it, or that attempt similar kinds of analytical work. 
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Mead’s ‘generalized other’ might provide one example, as would renderings of 
the ‘analytical third’ (Ogden, 1994; Straker, 2006), or ideas of distributed 
cognition (Hutchins, 1995, Hutchins & Klausen, 1996) or even of socially-
structured mind (Turner & Oakes, 1997). I should hasten to add however that the 
Structuralist quality of much Lacan, like his insistence on the primacy of the 
signifier over the subject – and his commitment to analyses of the functioning of 
the unconscious structured like a language – precludes any easy assimilation 
into orthodox psychological thought. At first glance this may seem to signal a 
dead-end to the broader project this paper proposes, namely a rejuvenation of a 
critical psychoanalytic social psychology via Lacanian thought. Then again, the 
argument I am asserting in this paper would make little sense if it were not viable 
to align aspects of Lacanian theory with a given set of social psychological 
problematics. To conclude then, some tentative comments regards how this 
concept might be helpful in the analysis of a particular social psychological 
phenomenon, and how it might shift understandings of the individual-social 
relation in social psychology in such a way that a novel form of critical 
psychology might be enabled. 
One of the historical strengths of psychoanalytic understandings of racism 
has been their ability to account for the tenacity of racist values, for the intensity 
of such beliefs and for the psychological structuring of such phenomena which 
appear to exceed exclusively sociological, discursive or historical explanations 
thereof (Clarke, 2003). By virtue of appeals to the unconscious and to certain 
volatile ego-ideas psychoanalytic theorists have been able to theorize not only 
racism’s resistance to change, but also its often explosive and eruptive nature, to 
appreciate that it often operates as a passionate world-view (Frosh, 1989; 
Cohen, 2002). .Unfortunately however we have here a case where a traditional 
strength overlaps with a fundamental weakness. What for many social and 
critical psychologists is reduced out of consideration in such psychoanalytic 
explanations are precisely the details of adequate historical and societal 
contextualization. The profoundly political dimension to racist sociality is 
effectively elided, such is the claim, in analyses of intra-psychic dynamics that 
make of racism an essentially individualized pathology of adjustment (Billig, 
1976; Dalaal, 2001).  
What the Lacanian concept of the Other makes possible is that we may 
retain a form of explanatory reference to the unconscious – so crucial in 
fathoming racism – without reducing it either to the inner depth of repressed 
emotions or to an ostensibly a-social sphere of primal instincts within the singular 
subject. Seshadri-Crooks (2000) makes this argument to great effect: the 
unconscious must not be grasped as a subterranean space opposed to 
consciousness, or as an inchoate, swirling mass of repressed contents, but 
rather as the subjective locus of the Other or the symbolic order. Elsewhere, 
Žižek (1994a) makes a similar point, reiterating the externality, and, as we might 
put it, the ‘relationality’ of the Lacanian unconscious which permits no easy 
separation off of subject from society: 
[T]he concept of the unconscious is to be conceived…as ‘trans-
individual’ – that is, beyond the ideological opposition of ‘individual’ 
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and ‘collective’ unconscious: the subject’s unconscious is always 
grounded in the transferential relationship towards the Other; it is 
always ‘external’ with regard to the subject’s…existence (p. 33). 
Seshandri-Crooks (2000) surveys a series of Lacan’s postulates on the 
unconscious to draw the following conclusions which she intimates are vital to 
analysis of racism: the unconscious is not a primal, archaic function; it is not a set 
of unorganized drives or repressed contents; it should not be viewed as a 
collection of an individual’s prohibited memories and desires. She (2000) points 
to Lacan’s crucial qualification of Freudian doctrine, namely the idea that it is not 
affects that are repressed, but the ideational representatives of affects, which 
Lacan understands within the rubric of the signifier. Hence Lacan’s procedural 
focus on the unconscious as occurring within the actions of speech, the idea, as 
emphasized above, that the Lacanian unconscious precisely is the processes of 
signification beyond the control of the speaking subject. 
We are left thus with a very different version of the unconscious to that 
typically attributed to Freud. Its contents and their articulation are never, as it 
were, pre-social, prior to language, or exclusively affective; they exist only by 
virtue of the operation of the signifier (which, we should not forget, includes the 
functioning of potent Master-Signifiers). This is an external rather than internal 
unconsciousness, activated in the operations and performances of language, in 
the subject’s grappling with their place - relative to the Other’s desire - in the 
symbolic order. We have, in short, a fundamentally trans-individual 
unconsciousness, one which is instrumental, as I have tried to show, not only in 
the replication of relations of power but also – inasmuch as it functions as  
Master-Signifier – of potent ideological beliefs and passionate world-views. 
Two possibilities are thus immediately apparent for social psychological 
accounts of racism that wish to involve a broader sociological/political frame of 
analysis - thus avoiding the pitfalls of crude psychological reductionism - while 
still operationalizing the notion of the unconscious.  Firstly, this Lacanian account 
of the unconscious bypasses the unhelpful circumscribing of a monadic subject 
whose internal pathology permits no possibility of generalization (the problem, in 
other words, of reducing racism to personal psychology). Secondly, grasping the 
unconscious as the subjective locus of the Other means that we avoid falling into 
the routine dualism of private versus public domains - a dualism which typically 
risks de-politicizing racism. 
This is something I have tried to highlight above: the linking into the social 
of the subject via the Other is constitutive of the subject. As such we should view 
the unconscious less as “an individual construct than as an entity that bridges the 
subject to…signification”, indeed, to social substance itself (Seshandri-Crooks, 
2000, p. 24). Moreover, given the subject’s insertion into a shared universe of 
signifiers – which come to represent their desire - the subject in their specificity 
“can come into existence only by borrowing the signifiers of its desire from the 
Other” (Seshandri-Crooks, p. 24). It would represent too much of a further detour 
to elaborate upon the Lacanian maxim that follows on from this point in the 
argument, namely the assertion that desire is always the desire of the Other. The 
implication, I would hope, is nonetheless clear: the seemingly private confines of 
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one’s desire, like that of fantasy – and indeed racist fantasy – which come to 
shape and structure this desire, need always be grasped in reference to this 
transferential relation to the Other, that is, in terms of the subjective locus of the 
Other. As schematic an offering as this is, I think it does at least signal a new 
possibility of collaboration between social psychological approaches focusing on 
the discursive operations of racism and psychoanalytic perspectives on racist 
subjectivity which insist on reference to the unconscious. 
To end I wish to anticipate a prospective criticism of my project here, 
namely the idea that Lacanian psychoanalysis should be rejected by social 
psychologists on the basis that it cannot be conceivably accommodated within 
the theoretical/methodological parameters of the discipline as it stands. I would 
advance a very different position: perhaps it is the conceptual domain of the 
social psychological itself that needs be broadened, revised, even radically so, if 
that is what is required for it to productively engage with advances in Lacanian 
thought. Reber’s (1985) Dictionary of Psychology offers the following by way of a 
definition of social psychology: 
social psychology [is] the discipline that attempts to understand…how 
individuals are influenced by the actual, imagined or implied presence 
of others… Social psychology exchanges freely ideas, models and 
methods with other social sciences (p. 709). 
We might argue over the degree to which this statement concords with the 
receptivity of today’s social psychology to contributions of other disciplines.  What 
however seems difficult to deny is that the conversation regards how social and 
critical psychology might profit from Lacanian psychoanalysis is by now long 
overdue.  
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